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Science du Droit et Romantssmre. By Julien Bonnecase. Paris, Recueil
Sirey, 1928. pp. Iv, 745.
This is an interesting and a valuable work. Professor Bonnecaso has
taken as his subject-matter the development of theories as to the naturo
and interpretation of law in France from approximately 1880 to the present
day. As the romantic movement in law, which Professor Bonnecase has
taken as his major theme, is not to be understood save as a revolt from
the older classical theories, this volume tends by consequence to be a con-
tinuation of the various studies which the author has made of the classic
nineteenth century schools of legal thought, particularly of his L'bcole do
l'Ex6g~se en Droit Civil (2d ed. 1924).
There is in the preface some indication of the flavor and the framework
governing the survey. In 1911, the author notes, Dean Hauriou of Toulouse
remarked that no jurist, since the appearance of Duguit's work on tie
State ten years before, had been prompted to subject the theories which
Duguit had there enunciated to direct criticism or to ascertain whether
they were of anarchic tendency or not. In essence, the present volume re-
sponds to the suggestion on a larger scale than Hauriou essayed; it places
the work of Duguit in the setting of the stream of French legal theory
during the last half century; regards that stream as basically romantic
in its outlook; and undertakes a critical examination of its significance.
The author's theme is thus the influence of the romantic movement upon
legal science. The method employed to develop the theme, ostensibly chosen
to avoid misconstruction, is to permit the authors who have played a part
in the movement to speak for themselves. This device is pursued to antho-
logical extremes, which, while enhancing the usefulness of the work, at
times becomes quit, tiresome. The chief parts in the skeleton which support
the extensive mass of quotations are these: first, a preliminary section in
which the factors in the shift from "Exegesis" to "Romanticism" in the
field of law are traced and the symptoms of the shift illustrated; second,
an analysis of the various earlier philosophical forms assumed by juridical
romanticism and the affiliated mysticism; third, an exposition of Geny's
threefold distinction of science, technique, and method, suggesting the in-
timate relations between romanticism and legal science in Geny's sense;
fourth, an elaborate description of the various contemporary manifestations
of the "mal du sicle,"--the confusion of law and morals, the emphasis
on jural "psychologism," the reception of German mystical notions as to
legal evolution, the appearance of sociological theories of law. Throughout,
the discussion is fortified by interesting and often illuminating excursions
into allied fields, literary criticism, philosophy, and science, to expose and
enforce points at issue.
The most important matter involved in all this is the thesis, for thesis
there is despite the appearance of impartiality, which prevents the author
from being other than implicitly clear as to where he stands. If we may
attempt to formulate the point of view, it is that the inner secret of law
should be found in a rational order which imposes itself upon individuals;
the ;-ules involved in this order should be declared by the officers of the
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administration of justice, and should not have a content variable according
to the prejudices of an individual conscience-in short, a government of
laws and not of men. Though it is not expressly stated, in seeking the
basis of such an order, M. Bonnecase takes the right fork: the essence of
law is the rational application to life of ideas of justice, conformable to
the time and place. The alternative aspiration of social science that the
legal order should be provided with an observational basis is only obliquely
considered. The point of view adopted is obviously traditional in its emotion
and, like most traditional theses, is not defended on grounds of equity or
convenience but rather serves as a basis of criticism.
In this point of vantage, the author has provided himself with a principle
of negative analysis which not only enables him to criticize the romantic
movement in law but even to use it as the common denominator for the
treatment of systems of legal thought which might otherwise be thought
distinct. A primary question which the author may reasonably be asked is,
What indeed is this romantic common denominator? There is some indica-
tion of the author's reply on page 717 of the analytical tables:
"Ie le romantisme juridique, a l'instar du romantisme littiraire, rejette
l'existence d'une rbgle s'imposant du dehors, et plus particuli~renent d'une
r~gle A caractre m6taphysique, qui serait lYexprmssion, socialment, de 'idg e
d'ordre inhrente & l'organisation m~me du monde; 2e le romantisme juri-
dique fonde la rgle de Droit sur le sentiment et rejette les concepts de ]a
raison, preftendant saisir directement la rialit6; "P, le romantisme juridique
d~laisse la conception historique du Droit dans sa port~e exclusive au profit
d'un culte tr~s accentu6 pour les directives venues de l'etranger; 4-1 Ie roman-
tisme juridique poursuit, en vertu d'idses trop preecongues, uno lutte im-
pitoyable contre les notions traditionnelles; it est anim du n:tme esprit
r6volutionnaire que le romantisme litt6raire."'
The forms which the romantic tendency, as thus defined, have taken
are varied and numerous. The consummate type is furnished by those
theories which identify law with or subsume it under ethics. With this
type Professor Bonnecase has especial difficulty: such views tend to destroy
law as an autonomous science, to open wide the doors to judicial legislation
and subjectivism, to confuse the nature of the two disciplines, la, being
a science and ethics, as the author supports on authority, being concerned
with human character and the ultimate destiny of the individual. That a
counter to this view is possible, namely, that the identification of law with
a science of ethics will not deprive legal study of scientific character, the
author is well aware; however, he sticks by his authorities.
A second principal type assumed by legal romanticism is found in those
theories which place the basis of law in what Bonnecase terms "les donnes
sentimentales de la masse des consciences individulles." Externally, these
psychological interpretations of law are strongly reminiscent of the theory
of Savigny, which located the roots of law in the popular conscience; in
Duguit the doctrine leads to the well-known distinction between the law
of the jurists and the law of the people. The paradox in the working out
of this doctrine is that the jurists are thus given a wide power of inter-
preting the law which finds its basis in popular sentiment in order to create
a system of rules which shall control the individual. The produet of in-
dividual consciousness is its control. Internally, the psychological theories,
according to Bonnecase, are in the embarrassment (a) of relying upon an
empirical uniformity which cannot be experimentally ascertained, (b) of
identifying legal principles with vague and fluctuating movement, in pop-
ular opinion, (c) of expressing the irrational source of knowledge, which
legal romanticism involves, in a mystical refusal. The author's view is
that these doctrines are the result of mystical notions of progress denying
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the legal absolute, conjoined with an a prior-i scientific conception which will
have nothing to do with metaphysics. In a sense, these doctrines aro
congenial to the doctrines of Salcilles, which reject the rational ideal, and
even to the doctrines of sociological theory which tend to deny the individual
in the emphasis upon somewhat undefined social values.
In conclusion, the following remarks may be ventured. First, the author
has suggested an interesting approach to the *history of legal theory by
his use of analyses developed in the fields of literary criticism and what
may be termed scientific philosophy. Second, his criticisms of intuitional,
socio-psychological or sociological theories of law are such as to raise the
question as to whether these doctrines have really satisfied the need for
theories which will lay the basis for effective control of human conduct.
Certainly, the point that in some way or other these theories must take
account of the rational mechanics of analysis can scarcely be gainsaid.
Third, the impression remains, nevertheless, that the argument, valuable
as it is in marking out the field of battle, has yet failed to lay low the
enemy. Its effort is to meet the chief drive of the romantic movement by
ensuring a conjunction between legal science and metaphysics: this, how-
ever, tends to avoid the real point of attack, which concentrates on the
question, How the conventions of law can be made appropriate and effective
in dealing with an extremely complicated mass of social problems, varying
in time and place. Ultimately, the argument puts the opprobrious term,
"anarchic," upon non-traditional efforts to render law flexible to the prob-
lems of life. But that, of course, is no more than to start the issue.
Baltimore, Md. HESSEL E. YNTEMA.
Federal Income and Estate Tax Laws. By Walter E. Barton and Carroll
W. Browning, (4th Edition) Washington, John Byrne & Co., 1929. pp.
xlv, 766. $15.
Federal Tax Practice. By Robert H. Montgomery. New York, The Ronald
Press, 1929. pp. vi, 757. $10.
Federal Income Taxation. By Joseph J. Klein. New York, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1929. pp. xxv, 1749. $10.
These recent works are indispensable to the income tax practitioner as
essential tools in his working library. Each of these books has been pre-
pared by practitioners who have incorporated in their works the most
modern devices of indexes, appendices, and annotations. Those of us who
have worked during the last fifteen years with the more or less unscientific
materials available in this technical field find ourselves under great obliga-
tions to the authors who have prepared these works.
There is of necessity a considerable duplication of materials. Each work
contains the Revenue Act of 1928 and the Revenue Act of 1926 with paral-
lel references. Messrs. Barton and Browning present the Revenue Acts
of 1928, 1926, 1924, 1921, 1918, and 1917 in parallel column form with
annotations at the bottom of each page and the whole preceded by an
alphabetical table of cases. The work of Messrs. Barton and Browning
will be especially appreciated in the briefing of cases where it is desired
to make parallel comparisons between specific provisions of the revenue
acts in order to illustrate the development of a specific tax theory as ex-
pressed in its growth in the tax law itself. The parallel form adopted by
Messrs. Barton and Browning offers the constant difficulty that the authors
must break the sequences of paragraphs in the various acts in order to
afford physical comparison as between paragraphs of similar import. This
detracts from the usefulness of their book at the counsellor's table at hear-
BOOK REVIEWS
ings unless, indeed, the counsellor can project upon his own memory the
sequence of parallel citations. One is also impressed by the meagre char-
acter of the annotations. Despite the several thousand cases already cited
by the Board of Tax Appeals which are used by Messrs. Barton and
Browning in their annotations, there remains a very considerable amount
of statutory language in the Revenue Acts which has not as yet been passed
upon by the Board of Tax Appeals. A striking illustration of this is found
in the annotations as to the various clauses relating to statutory reorgan-
izations.
Dr. Klein includes as Appendix A of his work a "Comparison of the
Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928 with Indexe' prepared by Clayton F. Moore
for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives.
This appendix is reprinted in Dr. Klein's work without annotations of
Board of Tax Appeals decisions.
Professor Montgomery includes as Appendices C, D, and E of his work
the Revenue Act of 1928, the Revenue Act of 192G and a table of parallel
references. It will be seen that the text of law as given in the works of
Dr. Klein and Professor Montgomery is in both cases a duplication of
material already in hand in the office of every practitioner and is without
the benefit of either the exhaustive parallel physical presentation or the
annotations which characterize the work of Messrs. Barton and Browning.
In the opinion of this reviewer, the work of Messrs. Barton and Brov ning
is indispensable and the similar material in the appendices of the other
two works is superfluous, if not open to the objection of padding.
Professor Montgomery has given us a useful treatise, written in popular
style, of the administrative organization within the Treasury Department
concerned with administration, assessment, and collection of d-ficiencies,
credits, refunds, and penalties. This is the most useful part of the work
of Professor Montgomery, as it gives in synoptic form the story of tke
Treasury Department's administrative organization as it existed in 1928.
Doubtless much of this material will soon be outdated and the Bar must
continually rely upon Professor Montgomery and his associates in the
annual revision of this statement of treasury practice. The materials with
reference to practice before the United States Board of Tax Appeals given
in Part II of Professor Montgomery's work will probably prove of less
value to the practitioner. Much of the substance of Part II consists of
comment by Professor Montgomery on the rules of the Board. Mozt prac-
titioners will prefer to rely upon their own experience with court prece:lure
and the law of evidence. Certified public accountants who att2rwrt to
practice before the Board will do very well indeed to pay careful attention
to the cautionary comments of Professor Montgomery. Lawyers familiar
with the monumental treatises on evidence by Wigmore, Jones and the other
classical legal authors must need find the comments of Professor Hcnt -
gomery rather startling in their brevity. Witness the eleven lines at the
top of page 366 in which Professor Montgomery disposes of the parol
evidence rule. It cannot be said that Professor Montgor.ery har, made
good on the claim of the preface that his work "is designed as a compr -
hensive commentary of the practice in such cases, from the time of the
first hearing before the Treasury, to the final argument before a court of
last resort," unless the 'Stress is put upon commentary and the sens e re-
stricted to commentary of use to novices. Having said this much, it must
be said that Professor -Montgomery has given us the best vuorl: we nnw
have on the general subject matter of federal tax practice. It is to he
hoped that there may be an annual revision of the work with an increasing
use of annotations so that "comment" may finally rest upon the official
expressicns of the Board of Tax Appeals and of the courts.
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Dr. Klein has comprehended in one treatise a text statement of the major
features of federal income taxation law followed by a text statement of
procedure both in the Bureau and before the Board of Tax Appeals. Dr.
Klein illustrates his work with extensive references to settled cases. In
the actual use in practice of Dr. Klein's book it must be stated that the
reviewer has discovered no errors in such annotations and references. The
tables of cases and the index which conclude Dr. Klein's work have been
prepared with great care and are exceedingly useful. It is not too much
to say that an attorney who can afford to own but ine book on federal
income taxation should own this 1929 work of Dr. Klein. Dr. Klein bases
his statements in a scholarly manner upon the statutes and decided cases.
Beyond this he confines his comment in larger part to an indication of
undecided or new points. This makes the work useful in that the reader
does not need to struggle between the mere opinion of the author and what
may be taken to be the present state of the law on any particular point.
It is rather a triumph for Dr. Klein that he has accomplished this without
making the style of his text unattractive.
The publication of the three important works cited above now makes it
possible for the preparation of a casebook on federal income tax law and
practice. The preparation of such a casebook will of course be of great
consequence to the law school teacher who has the problem of teaching
this subject. More than that, the preparation of such a book will be
of incalculable benefit to income tax authors who may be incited thereby
to distinguish cases.
This review would be ungenerous if it did not conclude, as it began,
with the frank admission that these three books are of superior order as
compared with the general literature in the field. The work of Messrs.
Barton and Browning paves the way for definite annotations such as are
the first requisite in the preparation of briefs. The work of Professor
Montgomery tends to indicate the flow of sequences in tax matters and
unquestionably this work will become of first authority when each sentence
of opinion can have substituted for it a direct annotation to a settled case.
The work of Dr. Klein is a masterly summary of the entire field in compact
form. Here, then, are three reference works which the tax practitioner
may well have in his hand. Of course, the tax practitioner will continue
to win his cases on briefs based on statutory language and selected cases.
Probably there is no need here to warn the practitioner that Treasury
Department practices are in a state of flux and are dominated by person-
alities, or that these authors cannot be implicitly followed. The authors
make no such claim and we need not make it for them.
The general format of each of these works is excellent. The principal
criticism to be made of each of them is that cases are cited as supporting
general rules when without much legal dexterity most of the decided cases,
particularly those of the Board of Tax Appeals, can be distinguished as
settling only very narrow aspects of statutory interpretations in quite
restricted fields of fact.
Chicago, Ill. GEORGE E. FRAZER.
Corporate Advantages without Incorporation. By Edward H. Warren.
New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1929. pp. x, 1012. $15.
With the publication in modern times of carefully prepared digests and
elaborate encyclopmdias of law, the practicing lawyer resorts for aid less
frequently than in former days to textbooks or treatises. There are, to be
sure, certain textbooks-I have in mind particularly Professor Williston's
[Vol. 39
BOOK REVIEWS
-in which are to be found authorities and reasonings which are of real
assistance in solving problems which arise in practice. But Professor
Warren's book, Corporate Advantages suithout IWorporation, is not in
that class. It was written apparently with no such thing iri mind.
The primary purpose of the treatise, as the author himself states, is
"to inquire whether today it is proper for the courts to treat a body of
men who have united to further their financial interests as a legal unit,
when there is no legislative authority for so doing." In other words, the
inquiry is as to the state of the common law on this subject.
It must be obvious, I think, that such an inquiry is of comparatively
little importance to the profession, for even if the courts lack authority at
common law to treat as a legal unit a body of men united to further their
financial interests, it is so easy to secure such authority by legislation that
the question would not seem to warrant such energy and diligence as
Professor Warren has devoted to it. Moreover, the fact that corporations
are now in such general vogue as instrumentalities for the transaction of
business, and that the statutes and decisions regarding them are such fa-
miliar knowledge, diminishes interest in the question as to how one may
secure these advantages in another way than by incorporation.
It is true, however, that there are certain business activities which it
is still impossible or impracticable to carry on through the instrumentality
of a corporation. Notable among these is the business of stock exchange
houses, since the rules of various stock exchanges require that members
shall not incorporate, but must conduct their business as partner-. Labor
unions afford another illustration of those-uniting to further their interest
where incorporation is considered by their leaders or members impracticable
or undesirable. If Professor Warren in his treatise had offered concrete
suggestions as to methods for securing corporate advantages without incor-
poration in such cases, his book, in a limited way, would have been of
practical assistance as a handbook for such of the profession as might
have to deal with these situations.
But the book offers no such suggestions. Indeed, it does not appear to
have been written with any such purpose in mind. While the author devote2
an entire chapter to the labor union decision in the Coronado case, his
object there is to show merely that in that case the decision of the Supreme
Court that the labor union did constitute a legal unit was not a decision
to the effect that the Court could treat the union as a legal unit under
the authority of the common law, but rather to show that the Court felt
that Congress had given legislative authority so to treat the union.
It is a notable and rather surprising feature of the book that Professor
Warren does not appear to have tried to state what the law is upon the
decided cases, rather than to point out what the law ought to be, to cite
errors which courts have sometimes made in their recorded decisions, and
to reconcile other decisions with the legal proposition which he attempts
to establish.
I have spoken of this feature as surprising. It is surprising because
it is so inconsistent with Professor Warren's well-known reputation as a
teacher; for a fundamental characteristic of Professor Warren in his
teaching has always been that his students should learn from decided
cases what the law is, rather than to philosophize as to what the law
ought to be.
On more than one occasion recently, law school students in the course
of their study have expressed to me a feeling of discouragement. As one
said, "I cannot understand what this is all about, or how the things we
are being taught and told to learn can ever be of much use to us in
practice of law. If they do represent the things that a successful prac-
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titioner must know, I despair of ever being a success, for I can make
neither head nor tail out of the business."
As I have read Professor Warren's book I have been reminded of these
remarks of discouraged and rather befogged law students. I have been
led to wonder whether the perusal by law students of such a book, dealing
with such questions, might not result in discouragement rather than in
benefit. The inquiry is so remote from any practical problem that any
siudent is likely to be called upon to deal with in a lawyer's office that I
should expect that he would receive little if any benefit from the study.
I have been led to wonder, too, whether law schools in general may not be
directing their students too much toward the discussion of abstract and
rather unimportant, theoretical questions, to the sacrifice of such instruction
as will give them proper preparation to deal with practical problems which
will arise in the pursuit of their profession.
It ought to be said, however, with reference to this book, that Professor
Warren's inquiry on the subject with which he deals presents an exhaustive
and painstaking research and a rarely acute analysis of certain judicial
decisions. His style of expression throughout the book is admirable. His
statements are clear, his logic is persuasive, and his conclusions are con-
vincing.
A perusal of the book is distinctly an intellectual pleasure.
Boston, Mass. SHERMAN L. WIIIPPLn.
Economic Foreign Policy of the United States. By Benjamin I. Williams.
New York, McGraw Hill Co., 1929. pp. viii, 426. $5.
There is perhaps no phase of activity in which the United States has
developed, reversed its previous policies, or taken a more positive stand in
international affairs since the war than the field of foreign economic re-
lations. The change from agriculture to industry, the increase of financial
interest in other countries, the search for foreign markets, that have
marked the last twenty years, and other departures from long-established
national habit, are all reflected in the record of government action by the
executive, Congress, or the various departments, in particular the Depart-
me~nt of State. It is not enough, however, for the student or the statesman,
or even the merchant or manufacturer, to know of isolated cases where the
government has taken an active part in international economic questions;
the historical background, the precedents established, are of the greatest
importance, and must always be considered.
Professor Williams has produced a book that is characterized by pains-
taking research, by exhaustive consideration of each topic, and by a clear,
direct style of writing. Each subject is presented separately, first as a
historical record, and then as a study of policies, with a minimum of repeti-
tion where this is unavoidable. Past events have been placed in their proper
setting as guides for future action, and the favorable or unfavorable effect
of different policies clearly indicated. The author has spared. no effort to
show how in his own words, "the time-honored policy (of the United States)
has been forced to give way before changing conditions and ideals." While
in this sentence he refers particularly to the policy of "neutrality and non-
intervention" in Mexico and South America, the phrase may be taken as
the key-note to the whole book.
Professor Williams begins with a synopsis of the "dollars and cents
realities of world politics," and a study of the background and general
principles of American economic foreign policy, in which the present situ-
ation of the United States as a creditor nation, with vast capital invested
abroad, with industrial overproduction seeking a market, and a government
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machine earnestly endeavoring to further the legitimate desire for expan-
sion are clearly delineated. Against this background he places the various
methods used by government to achieve the ends desired: aid to American
foreign investment, protection of capital invested abroad, search for foreign
markets, assurance of supplies of imported raw materials, even the develop-
ment of shipping; in all these moves the American government has taken a
decisive part, adapting its policies to the individual case, but pursuing, as
the author presents the case, a reasonably logical, if often aggressive course.
There is little attempt to criticize these policies; Professor Williams usually
contents himself with describing them, though occasionally he permits him-
self a caustic comment, as "The sale of American recognition for a price
to factions that are willing to pay for it is not exactly in accord with the
orthodox notions of international law but is, nevertheless, a potent means
of dictating the policies of weaker governments without the necessity of
force." This reference is to the various "interferences" by the United
States in the Central and South American countries, to which the author
devotes a number of chapters or paragraphs describing different forms of
"big brotherly" action. He maintains, however, a neutral attitude in this
controversial situation, although he suggests that in all probability "the
injury to American prestige (of the policies pursued) has exceeded any
resultant gains."
In Professor Williams' opinion, "financial control is the American adap-
tation of imperialism," and he gives a number of instances of this new
imperialism, as applied to South America, Liberia, and even, as he shows
in a remarkably clear summary of the inter-allied debt question, in Europe.
But his belief that "there seems to be no sentiment for further territorial
expansion as an aid in the race for foreign markets" should be consoling
to those who fear that loans to a country merely pave the way, as in history
they often have done, for seizure of foreign territory.
To tariffs and tariff policies the author devotes a good deal of attention,
as an element in our foreign policy of great and far-reaching importance.
His discussion covers the "infant industry" stage in the United States,
bargaining and reciprocal tariffs, the most-favored-nation clause and its
peculiar complications, and finally the "open and closed door" policy. In
this ticklish subject, he has again limited himself to presenting historical
facts rather than arguments for or against protective tariffs. But he
cannot resist pointing out the truth that the "open door" is for the United
States to enter foreign countries, while to these same countries the door
into the dependencies of the United States is closed: a dualism of policy
that "is an evidence of the power of the business lobby."
In the discussion of government aid to shipping, Professor Williams
begins with "the cold gray dawn of post-war reconstruction," and traces
the development and implications of such doctrines as the freedom of the
seas, rights of neutrals, blockades, paper and actual, etc. This chapter,
while short, is worthy of more extended discussion than space permits.
Two chapters on "Raw Materials" must be summed up briefly. "The
United States is today waging a fight for freedom in the commerce of
raw materials," and incidentally trying to assure supplies of these materials
for itself by every available means. Here it naturally conflicts with those
countries possessed of a monopoly, more or less, of the materials in ques-
tion; and the resultant struggle has brought into play all the methods
by which a government can further the interests of its own nationals.
The contest, however, cannot be won by diplomatic complaints; only eco-
nomic forces can be of final avail.
Professor Williams' suggestions in his last chapter, "The Economic Di-
plomacy of the Future," emphasize the necessity of a far-sighted, states-
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man-like consideration of all the questions involved, and of avoidance of
local or temporary influences. The United States is at present "clearly
backward in the development of machinery for the friendly settlement of
international difficulties," and it must therefore ally itself with the exist-
ing machinery of this kind, the League of Nations, the World Court and
other agencies. With this conclusion no person capable of thinking inter-
nationally will disagree.
Washington, D. C. E. C. RorEs.
Cases on New York Pleading and P'ractice. By Harold R. Medina. Chicago,
Callaghan & Co., 1928. pp. xxxviii, 1005.
This is a competent and workmanlike product, done by an experienced
hand, which well attains at least a part of its stated objective. Professor
Medina says in his preface: "It is believed that a proper treatment of
the subject should include every phase of the ordinary actions and special
proceedings, including trial and appellate practice, so that the student
shall not approach his duties as a practitioner with a knowledge which
extends to only a few phases of the subject." And there is here presented
a complete and adequate picture in case form of the New York Civil
Practice Act from the summons on down through the trial to appellate
procedure and special proceedings. Mechanically it is presented in attrac-
tive form with an excellent index. To all those interested in this kind
of illustrative practice material the book should be extremely valuable.
But more doubt arises whether the editor has accomplished another stated
purpose of stressing "matters of theoretical importance." This purpose
is believed to be much more important than that of giving students the
mechanics of practice which they can more easily acquire by actual ex-
perience or by bar preparation courses. It is, however, difficult, pehaps
impossible, of achievement if the study is to be confined to the local prac-
tice of a single state. Unless the student considers the variations, 'even
the aberrations, of one state against a background of scientific study of
the subject as a whole, he will come to believe, as many lawyers do, that
only the local rule is workable, and that the more convenient and efficient
practice of an adjoining jurisdiction is to be summarily rejected as mani-
festly unsuitable. It is particularly unfortunate to study New York plead-
ing in this way, for in this state there is now a distinct tendency, with
only a few notable exceptions, towards a particularistic, meticulous and
retrogressive construction of the code.
To this difficulty is here added the further one of attempting to give
material dealing with substantially all the code. This leads to a selection
of cases which serve more to illustrate particular statutes than to present
problems for analysis and discussion. Thus Chapter X dealing with the
statute of limitations contains nine cases under eight different subheads.
Necessarily with this form of presentation of the subject, no attempt
is made to attack boldly the controversial problems of the subject. Thus
one of the anomalies of New York practice today is the inconsistent and
variable attitude of the several courts of that state towards the funda-
mental problems of the union of law and equity and the abolition of forms
of action. To this problem Professor Medina devotes less than five per cent
of his casebook with thirteen cases appearing under five different sub-
heads of such misleading (as it is believed) form as "Equitable defenses
in legal actions." Legal actions as such were abolished in New York
eighty-one years ago. In line with this general plan is the omission of
all reference to the many recent law review articles debating various
aspects of New York practice. Thus we find Susquehanna Steamship Co.
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v. Andersen & Co., 239 N. Y. 285 (dealing with "equitable defenses" and
their trial) reprinted once in full and another time in part with no
intimation of the serious questions which that case has raised and no
reference to the critical literature concerning it.
Thus we conclude that as a lawyer's desk manual or as a student's prac-
tice assistant, the book has its important uses. As a casebook for critical
study it is not so successful. In fact it is potentially dangerous, unless
most skillfully handled.
New Haven, Conn. CxILn_.S E. CrIL.
The Law of Bills of Lading and Contracts of Sldpmcnt. By Ernest W.
Hotchkiss. New York, The Ronald Press Co., 1928. pp. xviii, 287. 15.
This small volume was designed to treat of that "considerable body of
i-- relating to bills of lading" which has come into prominence com-
.,ercially in the last twenty-five years. With the adoption of uniform
legislation by many states since 1910 and the passage of the Federal Bills
of Lading Act in 1916, the subject has assumed new importance. This
legislation created the order bill of lading as a "document of title" having
certain aspects of negotiability. It is no longer merely a receipt for goods
coupled with a contract of carriage. Because of the greater security af-
forded to purchasers and lenders by the order bill, it has served in a sense
to unlock and make more readily available for commercial uses the
enormous values represented by goods in transit, a matter of considerable
economic significance.
The importance of the subject would justify a thorough, comprehensive
analysis of the prior law, the changes effected by statute and the present
position of bills of lading in the light of recent decisions. The prezent
work falls far short of any such object. In the first place only 148 pages
are devoted to discussion, the remaining 130 pages being taken up with
forms, statutes and such matters. The Federal Bills of Lading Act, the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the Interstate Commerce Act, the Britich
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and other lesser statutes are set out in
full. Strangely enough, the Sales Act provisions relating to bills of lading
are omitted although in many states they comprise the principal legisla-
tion on the subject.
But more serious even than the inadequacy of the space allowed for
development of the subject is the manner of treatment. Much of the vork
appears to consist of one sentence digests of cases. This has not been
well done, as often no distinction is made betveen order and straight bills.
lany sentences are so long and fully packed with qualifying facts and
phrases as to make them difficult of comprehension. This has resultcd
further in a jerky, disjointed sequence of ideas. There is very little inde-
pendent analysis of the subject apart from cases, and almost no diecuossion
of the implication of the cases cited. In many instances a single case is
left to support a point on which there has been much conflict in decision.
Possibly an illustration may be permitted. On page 100 the following
sentence appears supported by a Texas Civil Appeals case:
"Title has been held to pass under an order bill of lading where such
a bill was sent to a bank with a draft attached and the shipment was de-
livered by the carrier without payment of the draft, and the shipment
could not be recovered from the innocent purchaser because of a dealer's
contract, tending to show that it was the intention that title should pass
to the person to whom the shipment was delivered, when such shipment was
delivered to the carrier."
The next sr.,tence reads,
1929]
